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There is a growing consensus that the brain computes value and
saliency-like signals at the time of decision-making. Value signals
are essential for making choices. Saliency signals are related to
motivation, attention, and arousal. Unfortunately, an unequivocal
characterization of the areas involved in these 2 distinct sets of
processes is made difficult by the fact that, in most experiments,
both types of signals are highly correlated. We dissociated value
and saliency signals using a novel human functional magnetic
resonance imaging decision-making task. Activity in the medial
orbitofrontal, rostral anterior cingulate, and posterior cingulate
cortices was modulated by value but not saliency. The opposite
was true for dorsal anterior cingulate, supplementary motor area,
insula, and the precentral and fusiform gyri. Only the ventral
striatum and the cuneus were modulated by both value and
saliency.
Keywords: attention, decision-making, motor preparation, saliency,
valuation
Introduction
There is a growing consensus in behavioral neuroscience that
the brain makes simple decisions by assigning values to the
different stimuli under consideration and then comparing
those values to make a choice (Montague and Berns 2002;
Rangel et al. 2008). This has motivated much interest in
locating the neural substrates of value computations at the time
of choice. Multiple studies have investigated this question using
human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
monkey and rat electrophysiology (Wallis and Miller 2003;
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006; Kable and Glimcher 2007;
Plassmann et al. 2007; Tom et al. 2007; Hare et al. 2008) and
have found that activity in areas such as the medial
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), and ventral striatum (VStr) correlate with behavioral
measures of stimulus value at the time of choice. These results
have been widely interpreted as evidence that these areas are
involved in the valuation stage of the decision-making process.
Unfortunately, identifying neural activity associated with
value signals is difficult because in many experimental
paradigms value and saliency signals are highly correlated: the
higher valued items also attract more attention, engage higher
levels of motor preparation, and lead to higher levels of
emotional arousal (Maunsell 2004; Roesch and Olson 2004). As
a result, without further controls, one cannot conclude that
a correlation between neural activity and value implies that this
activity is truly involved in value coding for the purposes of
decision-making. It is important to emphasize that this
potential confound is not a mere theoretical curiosity, since
activity correlated with value has been found in areas
traditionally associated with visual processing such as V1
(Serences 2008), areas involved in motor preparation such as
the supplementary motor area (SMA) (Wunderlich et al. 2009),
and areas involved in visual attention such as lateral
intraparietal cortex (Platt and Glimcher 1999). Some studies
have attempted to control for these types of confounds (e.g.,
Plassmann et al. 2007), but the existing controls have not been
able to rule out this confound in all the areas that have been
shown associated with valuation at the time of decision-making
in human fMRI studies.
Here, we present the results of a novel human fMRI decision-
making task designed to dissociate value and saliency signals at
the time of choice, thus addressing this problem. Value signals
provide a measure of the desirability of the stimuli, which is
given by the expected amount of reward that they generate if
consumed (Montague and Berns 2002; Glimcher et al. 2005;
Rangel et al. 2008). Value signals are positive for appetitive
stimuli and negative for aversive stimuli. In contrast, saliency
signals provide a measure of the importance of the stimulus,
which plays an important role in allocating attentional,
motivational, and other computational processes in the brain.
Saliency signals are larger for stimuli that are likely to have
a larger impact in the organism, such as highly appetitive or
highly aversive consumption items.
The basic idea of the experiment is simple. Subjects are
shown appetitive and aversive foods, spanning a range from
‘‘strongly disliked’’ to ‘‘strongly liked,’’ and are asked to indicate
through a button press whether or not they want to eat them at
the end of the experiment. The presence of both appetitive and
aversive stimuli of varying degrees of preference allows us to
separate value from nonvalue signals: Whereas an area
encoding for value should exhibit monotonically increasing
activation from the very aversive to the very appetitive stimuli,
an area associated with salience should exhibit a stronger
response to strongly liked and strongly disliked items than to
‘‘weakly liked’’ and ‘‘weakly disliked’’ items.
Several studies have provided evidence for a dissociation
between these 2 types of signals at the time of stimulus
consumption (Anderson et al. 2003; Small et al. 2003), or in
Pavlovian paradigms inwhich no decisions aremade (Jensen et al.
2007; Cooper andKnutson 2008; Matsumoto andHikosaka 2009).
However, only 2 animal studies to date have attempted to control
for this important confound during decisions (Roesch and Olson
2004; Lin and Nicolelis 2008). Roesch and Olson (2004) collected
recordings from neurons in the macaque orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) and premotor cortex in a simple binary decision paradigm.
They found value signals in OFC and motivational attentional-
arousal signals in premotor cortex. Lin and Nicolelis (2008) found
similar motivational attentional-arousal signals in rat basal
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forebrain neurons. However, a whole brain search aimed at
dissociating both types of signals in humans at the time of
decision-making has not been carried out to date, and it is
unknown if areas such as the cingulate cortex are associatedwith
value or saliency processes.
Two aspects of the study are worth highlighting from the
outset. First, while our experiment allows us to dissociate value
signals from those that are associated with motor preparation,
attention or arousal, it does not allow us to dissociate between
areas involved in the latter set of processes. Nevertheless, given
the importance for behavioral neuroscience of characterizing
the neural substrates of stimulus valuation, distinguishing areas
that have the properties of value signals from those that are
associated with alternative correlated computations is crucial
for correctly interpreting both existing and future results.
Second, our results show that many previous studies were
correct in interpreting activity in areas such as the mOFC, ACC,
and posterior cingulate cortex as value signals, since their
activity correlates with value but not saliency measures. We
emphasize that such ex post confirmation of existing results
does not detract from the importance of carrying out this
experiment, since ruling out this important confound would




Twenty subjects participated in the experiment (16 males, ages
19--52 years). All subjects were right-handed, healthy, had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, had no history of psychiatric diagnoses,
neurological or metabolic illnesses, and were not taking medications
that interfere with the performance of fMRI. Subjects also reported not
having a history of eating disorders and were screened for liking some
of the foods described below and disliking others. Subjects were told
that the goal of the experiment was to study food preferences and gave
written consent before participating. The review board of the California
Institute of Technology (Pasadena, CA) approved the study. Subjects
received $35 for their participation.
Stimuli
Subjects made decisions on 60 different food items. The set of food
items was selected based on prior behavioral pilot data to span positive
and negative preferences for most subjects. Thirty items were selected
from a set of pictures that was rated as appetitive by most subjects.
These included sweet and salty snack foods such as potato chips and
candy bars. Thirty additional items were selected from a set of pictures
that was rated as aversive by the majority of subjects. Examples include
various types of canned meat such as liverwurst and various types of
baby food. The foods were presented to the subjects as color pictures
(72 dpi) using video goggles.
Task
Subjects performed 2 tasks: a liking-rating task prior to the fMRI session
and a food choice task during the scanning session.
During the liking-rating task, subjects were asked to provide ratings
(–2 = NOT AT ALL to 2 = VERY MUCH) for each of the 60 food items
that they would encounter during the scanning task. The ratings were
anchored to the question ‘‘How much would you like to eat this item at
the end of the experiment?’’
The food choice task is described in Figure 1A. Subjects were
instructed not to eat immediately before arriving for the experiment
and to have eaten no more than a light meal in the 4 preceding hours.
In each trial, subjects were asked to make a binding decision about
whether or not they wanted to eat the current food item at the end of
the experiment. The decisions were binding because subjects knew
that at the end of the experiment, a trial would be selected at random
and that their response on that trial would be implemented. Thus, they
would have to eat the food item shown in that trial if they said ‘‘Yes,’’
and they would not be allowed to eat it if they said ‘‘No.’’ On each trial,
they were presented with a picture of an item and had up to 2 s to
enter one of 4 responses: ‘‘Strong No,’’ ‘‘No,’’ ‘‘Yes,’’ or ‘‘Strong Yes.’’ Note
that this feature of the design allowed us to measure the choice and the
strength of preference simultaneously. Furthermore, the 4 responses
were used to define value and saliency measures as follows. The value
signal takes values from –2 (=Strong No) to +2 (=Strong Yes). The
saliency signal takes a value of 1 (=No, Yes) or 2 (=Strong No, Strong
Yes). Each of the 60 items was shown 4 times in the scanning task,
twice per session in 2 consecutive sessions.
Trial ordering was fully randomized within and across subjects, with
pseudorandomized intertrial blank-screen intervals to ensure identical
full-task time across subjects. To avoid activation artifacts caused by the
assignment of responses to buttons, the mapping of responses to
buttons was counterbalanced (in the left-to-right directions) across
subjects.
fMRI Data Acquisition
The functional imaging was conducted in a Siemens 3.0-T Trio MRI
scanner. We acquired gradient echo T2
*-weighted echo-planar images
(EPIs) with blood oxygen level--dependent (BOLD) contrast. To
optimize functional sensitivity in the OFC, we used a tilted acquisition
in an oblique orientation of 30 to the anterior commissure--posterior
commissure line (Deichmann et al. 2003). We also used an 8-channel
phased array coil that yields a 40% signal increase in signal in the mOFC
over a standard head coil. Each volume comprised of 44 axial slices. A
total of 700 volumes (2 sessions, 16-min each) were collected in an
interleaved-ascending manner. The imaging parameters were as
follows: echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm; in-plane resolution
and slice thickness, 3 mm; repetition time, 2.75 s. Whole-brain high-
resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1 3 1 3 1 mm) were acquired
from every subject.
fMRI Data Preprocessing
The T1-weighted structural scans for each subject were coregistered
with their mean EPI and averaged together to permit anatomical
localization of the functional activations at the group level. Image
Figure 1. (A) Experimental design. (B) Reaction times by value (as measured by the
subjects’ responses). Error bars indicate ±1 standard error.
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analysis was performed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Temporal nor-
malization was applied to the scans with a time of acquisition of 1.9375
referenced to the last volume. To correct for subject motion, the
images were realigned to the last volume, spatially normalized to
a standard T*2 template with a resampled voxel size of 3 mm and spatially
smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full-width at half-maximum of
8 mm. Intensity normalization and high-pass temporal filtering (using
a filter width of 128 s) were also applied to the data.
General Linear Model
We estimated a mixed-effects general linear model of the BOLD activity
in the following 3 steps.
First, for each subject, we estimated a general linear model with
AR(1) and the following independent variables for each of the
2 sessions:
(R1) Indicator variable for item presentation during nonmissed
decision trials,
(R2) Indicator variable for item presentation parametrically modu-
lated by the value signal (coding: –2 = ‘‘Strong No,’’ –1 = ‘‘No,’’ +1 =
‘‘Yes,’’ +2 = ‘‘Strong Yes’’),
(R3) Indicator variable for item presentation parametrically modu-
lated by the saliency signal (coding: +1 = ‘‘Yes’’/‘‘No,’’ +2 = ‘‘Strong
Yes’’/‘‘Strong No’’),
(R4) Indicator variable for item presentation during missed decision
trials, and
(R5--R11) Six movement regressors and session constants.
Regressors R1--R3 were modeled using boxcar functions with
durations equal to the subject’s response time in that trial. R4 was
modeled using a boxcar function with a duration of 2 s. Each of the
regressors of interest (R1--R4) was convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function.
Second, we calculated the following first-level single-subject con-
trasts: 1) regressor R2 versus baseline and 2) regressor R3 versus
baseline.
Finally, for each of these first-level contrasts, we estimated a second-
level mixed-effects analysis by computing a 1-sample t-test on the
single-subject contrast coefficients. All figures and tables report results
at a level of P < 0.001 uncorrected with an extent threshold of
5 contiguous voxels. Anatomical localizations were carried out by
overlaying the t-maps on a normalized structural image averaged across
subjects, with reference to an anatomical atlas (Duvernoy 1999).
Post Hoc ROI Analyses 1
In order to measure the strength of the signals encoded in the regions
identified by the whole-brain analysis, we carried out an independent
region of interest (ROI) analysis. This allowed us to test, for example, if
areas in which activity correlated with value also exhibited activity
correlated with saliency and vice versa. The following procedure was
used to compute the effect size plots shown in Figures 2B, 3B, and 4B.
First, we extracted an estimate of the particular regressor of interest
(i.e., the estimated ‘‘beta’’ value) for each subject i from a voxel that was
identified using the GLM estimates from all other subjects except for i.
In particular, for each subject i, we identified a peak voxel for the
contrast of interest by selecting the voxel within the anatomical area of
interest that exhibited peak activity for that contrast in a mixed-effects
analysis that included all subjects except for i. Second, the set of
extracted beta values (one for each subject) were then averaged, and 2-
sided t-tests were used to test the significance of the regressor of
interest. For the effect size plot in Figure 4B, we used the peak voxels
from the associated reported conjunction analysis (but the procedure
was identical otherwise).
Post Hoc ROI Analyses 2
In order to provide further verification that the BOLD responses varied
with the behavioral choices as suggested by the previous analyses, we
estimated an additional GLM model with AR(1) (all omitted details are
as in the main GLM):
(R1) Indicator variable for item presentation receiving a ‘‘Strong No’’
response,
(R2) Indicator variable for item presentation receiving a ‘‘No’’
response,
(R3) Indicator variable for item presentation receiving a ‘‘Yes’’
response,
(R4) Indicator variable for item presentation receiving a ‘‘Strong Yes’’
response,
(R5) Indicator variable for item presentation during missed decision
trials, and
(R6--R12) Movement regressors and session constants.
We then extracted beta values for regressors R1--R4 using the same
procedure described above, which is necessary to guarantee that the
ROI analysis is independent from the whole-brain analysis. The
resulting effect size plots are reported in Figures 2C, 3C, and 4C.
Results
The basic idea of the experiment is simple (Fig. 1A). In every
trial, subjects were shown a picture of either an appetitive (e.g.,
potato chips and candy bars) or an aversive food (e.g., canned
meats and baby foods) and had to decide if they wanted to eat
that food. At the end of the experiment, one of the trials was
selected at random and the decision made by the subject on
that trial was implemented. Importantly, subjects made their
choices using a 4-point scale (‘‘Strong No,’’ ‘‘No,’’ ‘‘Yes, ’’Strong
Yes’’).
The behavioral response allowed us to define 2 signals of
interest. First, the value of an item was given by the magnitude
of the response: –2 = ‘‘Strong No,’’ –1 = ‘‘No,’’ +1 = ‘‘Yes,’’ and +2 =
‘‘Strong Yes.’’ Second, we define a ‘‘saliency signal’’ given by the
absolute value of this response coding: +1 = ‘‘Yes’’/‘‘No’’ and
+2 = ‘‘Strong Yes’’/‘‘Strong No.’’ The term saliency is meant to
capture the variety of psychological processes (such as
attention, motor preparation, and arousal) that might be
activated more strongly for highly liked or disliked items, than
for weakly liked or disliked ones.
Behavioral Results
Figure 1B shows that the saliency of the stimulus had an effect
on response times: strong responses (high-saliency) were
significantly faster than weak responses (low-saliency; t77 =
–4.22, P < 0.0001). Positive responses, regardless of strength,
were also significantly faster than negative responding (t77 =
–2.98, P = 0.004).
Brain Activity Correlated with Value
Activity in the mOFC, rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC),
and dorsal posterior cingulate cortex (dPCC) was positively
correlated with value (Fig. 2A; for a complete list of activations,
see Table 1). No areas exhibited negative correlation with value
at our omnibus threshold of P < 0.001 uncorrected.
We carried out 2 independent post hoc effect size analyses
in these ROIs (for details, see Materials and Methods) because
previous studies have argued that these areas are associated
with value computation at the time of choice (Wallis and Miller
2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006; Kable and Glimcher
2007; Plassmann et al. 2007; Tom et al. 2007; Hare et al. 2008).
An effect size analysis, depicted in Figure 2B, showed that
activity in these areas was correlated with value but not with
saliency. Note also that value signals increased monotonically
with the behavioral responses. To verify that this is the case, we
independently estimated the average BOLD response by
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behavioral choice. As shown in Figure 2C, activity in the mOFC,
rACC, and dPCC increased monotonically with the positivity of
the choice, consistent with value coding.
Brain Activity Correlated with Saliency
Activity in several areas, including the dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC), SMA, precentral gyrus, posterior insula, and
fusiform gyrus (Fig. 3A; for a complete list of activations, see
Table 2) correlated positively with the saliency measure but
not with value. No areas exhibited negative correlation with
saliency at our omnibus threshold of P < 0.001 uncorrected. An
independent post hoc effect size analysis showed that activity
in these areas did not correlate with value (Fig. 3B).
Saliency signals should exhibit a U-shape with regard to the
behavioral responses (i.e., activation should be larger for the
‘‘Strong Yes’’ and ‘‘Strong No’’ responses than the non-Strong
responses). To verify that this was the case, we independently
estimated the average BOLD response by behavioral choice. As
shown in Figure 3C, activity in all these areas exhibited the
required pattern. Note, also, that there were no significant
activation differences between trials with ‘‘Strong Yes’’ and
‘‘Strong No’’ responses or between trials with ‘‘Yes’’ and ‘‘No’’
responses, which shows that the saliency measure used in the
study is highly correlated with the computations performed in
these areas.
Brain Activity Correlated with Both Value and Saliency
Only the cuneus and VStr exhibited activation that correlated
positively with both the value and saliency signals. Figure 4A
shows the result of a conjunction analysis identifying areas of
the VStr in which activity was associated with both types of
signals (Table 3). Independent post hoc analyses of the effect
sizes and responses by behavioral choice using the previous
methods led to the same conclusion (Fig. 4B--C).
Discussion
The results in this paper provide a clear dissociation between
areas involved with valuation at the time of choice and saliency-
like signals that might be associated with attention, motor
preparation, or arousal. Activity in the mOFC, rACC, and dPCC
correlated with value but not with saliency signals. In contrast,
activity in the dACC, SMA, precentral gyrus, posterior insula,
and fusiform gyrus correlated with saliency but not with value.
Only activity in the VStr and the cuneus correlated with both.
Our results have implications for several areas of neurosci-
ence. First, a growing number of studies has found that activity
in the mOFC and rACC is correlated at the time of choice with
behavioral measures of the value of stimuli in a wide variety of
tasks (Wallis and Miller 2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006;
Kable and Glimcher 2007; Plassmann et al. 2007; Tom et al.
2007; Hare et al. 2008). This has been widely interpreted as
evidence that these areas might be involved in the assignment
Figure 2. (A) Regions in which activity was correlated with value included the mOFC
(6, 24, 21), rACC (1 39, 3), and dPCC (3, 33, 39). (B) Effect size plots for
these 3 areas showing that activity correlated with value but not with saliency. Note
that all effect size plots were constructed using a procedure that ensures
independence from the procedure used to identify the ROIs. Significance levels for
t-tests: **P \ 0.01, ***P \ 0.001. (C) Effect size plots for these 3 areas as
a function of the behavioral response.
Table 1






Region of activation Side BA T
9, 69, 27 232 Precuneus R 7 m 6.31
6, 69, 30 151 Precuneus L 7 m 5.95
39, 60, 9 29 Middle temporal lobe, subgyral L 5.83
6, 90, 3 41 Cuneus/lingual gyrus L 17 5.65
0, 39, 3 193 Rostral anterior cingulate L 32, 24 5.45
6, 42, 0 268 Rostral anterior cingulate R 32, 24 5.40
9, 81, 18 103 Cuneus R 17 4.98
24, 39, 54 25 Superior frontal gyrus R 8 4.86
39, 60, 45 17 Cerebellar tonsil R 4.69
3, 33, 39 127 Dorsal posterior cingulate L 31 4.58
6, 24, 21 49 Medial rectal/frontal gyrus, mOFC L 11 4.61
48, 57, 45 63 Supramarginal gyrus L 40 4.58
42, 63, 51 28 Angular gyrus R 7 4.45
51, 6, 24 12 Inferior temporal gyrus L 20 4.17
9, 39, 36 104 Dorsal posterior cingulate R 31 3.95
6, 24, 18 43 Medial frontal gyrus, mOFC R 11 3.92
6, 6, 9 15 VStr L 3.86
9, 9, 12 15 VStr L 3.84
21, 18, 18 5 Parahippocampal gyrus L 3.60
Note: Height threshold: T 5 3.5794, P 5 0.001 (uncorrected). Extent threshold: k 5 5 voxels.
BA5Brodmann area.
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Figure 3. (A) Regions in which activity was correlated with the saliency measure included the dACC (3, 0, 42), SMA (9, 12, 60), precentral gyrus (36, 18, 57), posterior
insula (33, 21, 15), and fusiform gyrus (30, 60, 18). (B) Effect size plots for these 5 areas showing that activity correlated with saliency but not value. Significance level
for t-tests: ***P\ 0.001. (C) Effect size plots for these areas as a function of the behavioral response.
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of values to stimuli during decision-making. Our data, together
with the findings by Roesch and Olson (2004), suggest that
this conclusion is justified even though previous studies did
not carry out the controls necessary to rule out the
involvement of these regions in attentional, motivational, or
arousal processes.
Second, our results contribute to the literature seeking to
dissociate value and saliency signals. Several previous studies
have presented evidence for and against such dissociations at
the time of stimulus consumption (Anderson et al. 2003; Small
et al. 2003), or in Pavlovian paradigms in which no decisions
are made (Jensen et al. 2007; Cooper and Knutson 2008;
Matsumoto and Hikosaka 2009). Although the computations
made by the brain in these tasks might be very different from
those made during decision-making, it is interesting to note
some common results. Cooper and Knutson (2008) found that
the VStr also correlates with both saliency and valence during
the anticipation of probabilistic rewards. In a related study,
Jensen et al. (2007) found both positive and negative pre-
diction error signals in a similar region of VStr (although see
Seymour et al. 2007 for results dissociating gain and loss
encoding in the striatum). Small et al. (2003) found valence
signals in OFC and anterior insula and saliency signals in the
amygdala, cerebellum, pons, and middle insula during a gusta-
tion task. Anderson et al. (2003) found valence signals in
response to odors in the OFC and saliency signals in amygdala.
Thus, some of the findings from these alternative paradigms
parallel the ones obtained here, which suggests that some
common valuation and saliency-type processes might be
activated at the time of decision and during consumption and
reward anticipation.
Closer to our study, Roesch and Olson (2004) recorded from
neurons in the macaque OFC and premotor cortex in a simple
binary decision paradigm in which values and saliency were
also orthogonalized. Consistent with our findings, they found
valuation signals in OFC and motivational--attentional--arousal
signals in premotor cortex. Lin and Nicolelis (2008) recorded
from rat basal forebrain neurons in a go/no-go task. They found
that activity in this area at the time of decision was modulated
by the saliency of the stimulus not by its value. However, since
they only had 2 stimuli (one positive and one negative), it is
hard to fully interpret the nature of the signals identified in this
area. The results in this paper extend these findings to humans
and provide evidence for the dissociation of saliency and value
signals during choice.
Third, our results provide new insights into the role of the
striatum in decision making. Several previous studies have
argued that this area is involved in the computation of value
signals (Kable and Glimcher 2007; Knutson et al. 2007; Tom
et al. 2007). Others have argued that it might be involved in
saliency and the deployment of motor responses (Horvitz 2000;
Tricomi et al. 2004; Zink et al. 2004). Our results show that
common regions of the striatum are involved in both value and
saliency computations at the time of decision-making. This
suggests that the striatum might be a critical area where the
value signals necessary to make choices come together with
the motor signals necessary to implement them.
Fourth, a comparison of our results with the literature on
risk coding also provides some novel insights about the role of
the anterior insula in valuation and decision-making. Recent
studies (Preuschoff et al. 2006, 2008) have shown activity in
the anterior insula correlated with the amount of risk that
individuals faced on a Pavlovian reward task with stochastic
payoffs. Note that the risk signal in this task closely resembles
a saliency signal, since it is high for stimuli with very high or
very low probability of reward, and close to zero for stimuli
with an average probability of reward. Together with our
findings, this suggests that the anterior insula might be involved
Table 3
Conjunction analysis showing regions in which activity during the decision period was correlated








12, 84, 3 62 Cuneus R 17 5.02
6, 12, 12 5 VStr L 4.54
9, 90, 3 37 Cuneus L 17 4.04
9, 12, 15 7 VStr R 3.74
Note: Height threshold: T 5 3.5794, P 5 0.001 (uncorrected). Extent threshold: k 5 5 voxels.
BA5Brodmann area.
Table 2






Region of activation Side BA T
30, 60, 18 505 Fusiform gyrus (O4) R 37 8.31
30, 54, 21 649 Fusiform gyrus (O4) L 37 8.23
36, 18, 57 438 Precentral gyrus R 4 7.18
54, 0, 36 56 Precentral gyrus L 4, 6 6.17
30, 27, 57 275 Precentral gyrus L 4 6.04
33, 21, 15 25 Insula, posterior L 13 5.61
12, 63, 51 61 Inferior semilunar lobule R 5.38
9, 81, 18 203 Cuneus R 17 5.29
9, 12, 60 172 SMA R 6 4.95
27, 54, 51 13 Cerebellar tonsil R 4.91
36, 9, 18 15 Temporal pole L 38 4.89
0, 3, 45 68 Dorsal anterior cingulate R 32#, 24# 4.67
3, 0, 42 42 Dorsal anterior cingulate L 32#, 24# 4.49
12, 81, 0 133 Lingual gyrus L 17 4.29
3, 12, 60 84 SMA L 6 4.11
9, 9, 14 6 VStr L 4.00
45, 18, 21 15 Insula, posterior R 13 3.87
12, 11, 15 11 VStr R 3.79
Note: Height threshold: T 5 3.5794, P 5 0.001 (uncorrected). Extent threshold: k 5 5 voxels.
BA5Brodmann area.
Figure 4. (A) Region of VStr (9, 9, 12) in which activity was correlated with
both value and saliency. (B) Effect size plots this area showing that activity correlated
with both value and saliency. ***P \ 0.001. (C) Effect size plots for this area as
a function of the behavioral response.
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in identifying stimuli with extreme values for a wide class of
stimuli and in a wide range of valuation-related tasks.
A few methodological and conceptual aspects deserve
further discussion. First, by defining the saliency signal to be
equal to the absolute value of the behavioral response, the
study implicitly assumed that strongly disliked and strongly
liked items induce attentional, motor preparation, or arousal
responses of equal strength. Theoretically, this is equivalent to
assuming that all these processes correlated with the ‘‘magni-
tude’’ of the value, regardless of its sign. While the previous
literature does not offer a guide about whether or not this is
a valid assumption, it is worth pointing out that the results in
Figures 2C, 3C, and 4C are consistent with the notion of
saliency employed here.
Second, the study does not assume that value is the only
driver of attention, motor preparation, or arousal. For
example, stimulus familiarity can influence attention, previous
experience making decisions with a stimuli is known to
influence the level of motor preparation, and visceral states
can have strong effects on overall levels of arousal. The only
assumption that this study makes is that these processes
might also be influenced to some extent by a stimulus’ value,
which is consistent with the reaction time data shown in
Figure 1B.
Third, a limitation of the study is that it cannot distinguish
between different attentional, motor preparation, and arousal
signals. However, it is important to emphasize that this is the
first human neuroimaging study that is able to systematically
rule out these confounds for areas, such as ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and rACC, that have been traditionally
associated with valuation. It is also possible to speculate about
their respective roles based on the previous literature. The
dACC, precentral gyrus, and SMA have been associated with the
preparation and execution of motor responses (Bush et al.
2002; Rushworth et al. 2004) and thus might be a critical part
of the motivational system. The insula has been shown to
encode bodily states and thus is likely to be associated with
arousal (Craig 2002). Finally, the fusiform gyrus has been
shown to respond selectively to certain types of stimuli and
thus might be involved in the deployment of attention
(Vulleumier 2005).
More generally, the results presented here show the
importance of including both appetitive and aversive stimuli
in decision-making studies whenever possible. Since a large
number of areas correlate with value when only appetitive or
aversive stimuli are included, it is easy to misinterpret as
valuation areas regions that are actually associated with
attention, motor preparation, or arousal processing.
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